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JONES V WOLF: NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES STANDARD
OF REVIEW FOR INTRA-CHURCH DISPUTES
In Jones v. WolfI the United States Supreme Court held that civil
courts are not required to defer to church hierarchical decisions award-
ing control of local church property to one faction in a congregational
schism. The Court approved use of any "neutral principle of law" that
does not require judicial consideration of ecclesiastical matters in set-
tling the property dispute.2 The decision in Jones v. Wof provides an
alternative to the traditional standard of judicial deference established
in Watson v. Jones.3 The decision represents a definite shift away from
mandatory judicial deference in church property disputes by allowing
civil courts to resolve such disputes irrespective of church decisions that
would otherwise determine control of the property.4
In Jones the Court was faced with the task of enforcing ostensibly
secular property rights within the context of an intra-church dispute.
The dispute involved a schism in a local congregation of the Presbyte-
rian Church in the United States. (PCUS), a national hierarchical or-
ganization. The majority faction voted to join another Presbyterian
denomination, while the minority remained loyal to the PCUS. A re-
gional judicatory of the PCUS reviewed the schism and declared the
minority faction of the congregation to be the true representative of the
Presbyterian Church. The minority then sought to assert its right to
possession of the local church building, based on the declaration of the
PCUS judicatory. The state court awarded control of the property to
the majority faction on the basis of neutral principles of law, ignoring
the traditional approach of judicial deference to hierarchical church
decisions established in Watson v. Jones. I The United States Supreme
Court in Jones approved the use by the state court of any "neutral prin-
ciple of law" that does not require direct judicial consideration of
church doctrine or policy.'
The existence of an alternative to the traditional Watson v. Jones
approach of judicial deference will facilitate and consequently en-
courage both judicial intervention in church property disputes and the
1. 99 S. Ct. 3020 (1979).
2. Id. at 3025-26.
3. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
4. See note 20 infra.
5. 99 S. Ct. at 3022-23.
6. Id. at 3025-26.
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use of courts by dissatisfied church factions to obtain civil review of
church hierarchical decisions. In its decision the Court failed to con-
front the fundamental reality of church property disputes: property is
merely an incident of ecclesiastical authority and, therefore, church
property disputes are merely manifestations of doctrinal disputes, over
which civil courts have no authority.' This critical failure of the Court
to examine the relationship between religious doctrine and control of
church property will undermine the ostensibly clearly drawn line of the
neutral principles rationale, causing it to become a source of more in-
fringement of religious freedom, rather than a source of protection
from such infringement.
I. EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CHURCH PROPERTY
DISPUTES
A. The Watson v. Jones Standard of Judicial Deference
The adoption of the neutral principles standard in Jones v. Wolfis
in large part a reaction to both the standard of judicial deference estab-
lished in Watson v. Jones and the failure of Watson to abolish the im-
plied trust doctrine.8 The holding in Jones v. Wolf does not merely
alter the nomenclature or methodology of civil court review of church
property disputes; rather, it changes the basic relationship between
church and state by allowing civil courts to engage in a much more
active, independent review of ecclesiastical disputes than was possible
under the restraints of Watson. The holding of Watson v. Jones, how-
ever, retains significance for several reasons. First, Watson remains a
judicially accepted alternative to the neutral principles standard after
Jones v. Wolf. Second, Watson provides an appropriate referent for
7. See, e.g., Kedroffv. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 121 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) ("What is at stake here is the power to exercise religious authority. That is
the essence of this controversy. It is that even though the religious authority becomes mani-
fest and is exerted through authority over the Cathedral as the outward symbol of a religious
faith.").
8. The first reference to the neutral principles rationale in the context of an intra-
church property dispute came in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem.
Presby. Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449, on remand sub nom. Presbyterian Church v. Eastern
Heights Presby. Church, 225 Ga. 259, 167 S.E.2d 658 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1041
(1970) in which the Court effectively abolished the use of the implied trust doctrine. "Since
the Georgia courts on remand may undertake to determine whether petitioner is entitled to
relief on its cross claims, we find it appropriate to remark that the departure-from-doctrine
element of Georgia's implied trust theory can play no role in any future judicial proceed-
ings." Id. at 450 (emphasis in original). The implied trust doctrine simply asserts that
church property is held in trust for those who remain faithful to the original tenets of the
religion. See text accompanying notes 30-33 infra.
9. The Watson standard of deference may be used if, under state law, the process of
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analyzing the neutral principles approach because the perceived inade-
quacies of the Watson standard were used to justify the acceptance of
the neutral principles alternative. Finally, Watson retains significance
because its facts are very similar to those of Jones v. Wo/f, yet the Court
in these cases reached disparate conclusions.
This disparity illuminates the differing concerns that served as the
bases of analysis for the respective courts. While the Court in Jones
focused narrowly on the standard of review to be used by civil courts
without considering the effects of that standard on the free exercise of
religion, the Court in Watson fashioned a standard of review based on
its desire to minimize the effect on freedom of religion. The decision in
Watson was based on the fundamental philosophical conviction that
persons should be free to unite in voluntary religious organizations and
to establish internal governing bodies sovereign as to the affairs of the
religious society.' 0 Given such a philosophical orientation, the ques-
tion facing the Watson Court was not merely which faction should pre-
vail, but rather, under what conditions and to what degree civil courts
should be allowed to review church decisions in order to decide prop-
erty disputes." The Court was aware that any standard of judicial re-
view that would allow a civil court effectively to reverse the decision of
an authoritative church body would infringe on the free exercise of reli-
gion of that church.' 2
In Watson, the congregation involved in the property dispute was
a member of a national organization of presbyterian churches that was
organized in a hierarchical manner.13 The general assembly, the high-
est church judicatory, issued instructions in 1865 that inquiry should be
made of any Southerner applying as minister or member to the church
identifying which faction represents a particular church does not "appear to require a civil
court to pass on questions of religious doctrine .... " 99 S. Ct. at 3028.
10. All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this
government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and
would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by
one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed. It
is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals
for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should
be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as
the organism itself provides for.
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 729.
11. Id. at 733-34.
12. Id.
13. The national organization to which the congregation belonged was the Presbyterian
Church in the United States of America. This was not the same church involved in Jones v.
Wolf, which is the Presbyterian Church in the United States. Both, however, are national
hierarchical organizations. See note 17 infra for a discussion of the structure of the organi-
zation.
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about his views on slavery. The Louisville presbytery, a regional gov-
erning body, denounced the general assembly's action. In turn, divi-
sion arose among the members of the Walnut Street Church in
Louisville, with the majority of the congregation siding with the gen-
eral assembly. The general assembly recognized the majority as the
true congregation, but a split among the trustees holding title to the
local church led to a suit in federal court to determine which faction
would be awarded the use and control of the local church property.'
4
Thus, the Court in Watson was faced with a congregational split within
the context of a hierarchical organization that had rendered a decision
on doctrinal issues that necessarily determined the control of local
property.
In affirming the decree of the circuit court awarding control of the
property to the faction loyal to the general assembly, the Supreme
Court enunciated a broad rule of judicial deference to authoritative
church decisions.'" The Court enumerated three basic ways in which
civil courts could determine beneficial use of the disputed property
without reviewing church decisions regarding doctrinal or ecclesiastical
matters. The first method involves the enforcement of an express
trust,' 6 which dedicates the property to or for specific uses or groups of
people. The second method of determining control of church property
is used when a congregation, which is not a member of a national
church organization,' 7 becomes divided over a doctrinal issue that re-
14. Because the first amendment had not yet been applied to the states, the only basis of
jurisdiction was diversity of citizenship within the congregation itself. See text accompany-
ing notes 34-35 infra.
15. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 723-27.
16. In regard to the first of these classes it seems hardly to admit of a rational doubt
that an individual. . . may dedicate property by way of trust to the purpose of
substaining, supporting, and propagating definite religious doctrines or principles
.... And it would seem to be the obvious duty of the court, in a case properly
made, to see that property so dedicated is not diverted from the trust which is thus
attached to its use.
Id. at 723.
There is some question as to whether courts may now enforce an express trust in favor
of a set of religious principles, as opposed to a particular group of people defined in non-
religious terms: "Hence, States, religious organizations, and individuals must structure rela-
tionships involving church property so as not to require the civil courts to resolve ecclesiasti-
cal questions." Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem. Presby. Church,
393 U.S. at 449. Creating an express trust in favor of certain religious tenets would involve
the same impermissible judicial determinations required by the implied trust doctrine. See
note 32 infra and accompanying text.
17. A local congregation consists of all of the active members of a particular parish or
church and can be a self-governing body. It may be connected to other local congregations
through national conventions, but such conventions usually have only advisory power. A
congregation may also become a member of a national hierarchical organization, such as the
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suits in a struggle for control of the local church property. In such
cases, a court is to defer to any decision made according to the usual
mode of congregational rule that necessarily awards the control of the
property to one of the factions. 8 If the congregation is governed by
majority rule, then the majority faction shall prevail, but if the congre-
gation is governed by a board of elders, its decision is final.19 The last
method of settling church property disputes is applied to congrega-
tional splits within a national hierarchical organization. In such situa-
tions, the Watson Court required civil courts to defer to the highest
church judicatory to rule on the dispute to the extent that the ecclesias-
tical decision determined control of the local property.2" Thus, judicial
Presbyterian Church in the United States, of which the Vineville congregation in the Jones
case was a member. The congregation is then bound by the doctrine of the national church
and the congregational property is subject to the control of the general church, either
through an express clause in the deed or through provisions in the national church constitu-
tion. The local congregation is governed ihrough a series of ascending bodies called judica-
tories, with the general assembly having final authority over all congregations. See Note,
Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1142,
1143 (1962).
18. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 725.
If the principle of government in such cases is that the majority rules, then the
numerical majority of members must control the right to the use of the property. If
there be within the congregation officers in whom are vested the powers of such
control, then those who adhere to the acknowledged organism by which the body is
governed are entitled to use of the property. The minority in choosing to separate
themselves into a distinct body, and refusing to recognize the authority of the gov-
erning body, can claim no rights in the property from the fact that they had once
been members of the church or congregation.
Id. The Court in Watson recognized that not all independent congregations would be gov-
erned according to majority rule, and therefore required civil courts to determine the deci-
sion-making structure of the congregation before resolving the dispute. Compare the
approach of Watson with the approach approved by the Court in Jones v. Wof. In Jones
the Court approved the use of a presumption of majority representation that must be rebut-
ted by the local congregation if some other mode of self-government is used. 99 S. Ct. at
3027. Such a presumption appears to infringe on the autonomy of local congregations to
determine their own organizational structure. However, the Court did provide that the pre-
sumption of majority representation could always be overcome "either by providing in the
corporate charter or the Constitution of the general church, that the identity of the local
church is to be established in some other way, or by providing that the church property is
held in trust for the general church and those who remain loyal to it." Id. at 3028. See text
accompanying notes 98-99 infra.
19. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 725.
20. In this class of cases we think the rule of action which would govern the civil
courts, founded in a broad and sound view of the relations of church and state
under our system of laws, and supported by a preponderating weight of judicial
authority is, that, whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical
rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories
to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions
as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them.
Id. at 726-27. Thus, the approach of Watson did not preclude all judicial review in church
property disputes, nor did it require absolute deference to church resolutions of such dis-
1979]
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review under Watson was limited to an inquiry into the mode of
church government and a determination of the existence of a decision
by an authorized judicatory. The court would then be required to defer
to that decision to the extent that it determined the rights of the parties
to control church property.21
It is important to note that the question presented to the Court in
Watson was not the validity of the general assembly's resolution of
doctrinal issues. Rather, the question presented was which faction was
legally entitled to beneficial use of the local church property.22 The
Court recognized, however, that a dispute over church property is not
merely an action to quiet title, divorced from doctrinal disputes, 23 and
that when a judicatory of the church has decided doctrinal questions
that necessarily determine control of the property, civil courts must de-
fer to the church decision in order to maintain the separation of church
and state.24 It is significant that the Jones Court cited Watson as au-
thority for the proposition that civil courts must defer to church deci-
putes. Under Watson, church decisions are to be considered as binding to the extent that
those decisions necessarily decide issues in the dispute before the court. In Watson, the
deeds named the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church or its trustees as grantees. The decision
of the national church hierarchy that the faction remaining faithful to the national church
constituted the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church therefore precluded judicial inquiry as to
which faction represented the grantee named in the deed. Id. at 727.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 699-700. The Court was reviewing the decree of the Circuit Court of Ken-
tucky, which had awarded the control and use of the property to the faction that had re-
mained faithful to the general assembly.
23. The Court stated:
[P]roperty [is] acquired. . . for the general use of a religious congregation which is
itself part of a large and general organization of some religious denomination with
which [the congregation] is more or less intimately connected by religious views
and ecclesiastical government.
• . . [The] property is purchased for the use of a religious congregation, and so
long as any existing religious congregation can be ascertained to be that congrega-
tion, or its regular and legitimate successor, it is entitled to the use of the property.
Id. at 726. The Court also characterized the dispute as "essentially ecclesiastical." Id. at
713.
24. Id. at 727. See note 20 supra. It is significant that the Court in Watson held that the
property dispute in that case was a matter of "discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule,
custom, or law." Id. at 727. It is difficult to imagine any church dispute that would not fall
into one of the categories listed by Watson as requiring judicial deference. The holding also
refers to the "sound view of the relations of church and state under our system of laws," id.,
which has been viewed as a reference to the first amendment underpinnings of the Watson
rationale. However, because Watson predated the application of the first amendment to the
states by the fourteenth amendment due process clause, it was not a constitutional decision
binding on the states. The language, however, had "a clear constitutional ring." Presbyte-
rian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem. Presby. Church, 393 U.S. at 446. See text
accompanying notes 36-42 infra regarding discussion in subsequent cases of Watson's un-
derlying principles as constitutional requirements.
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sions on doctrinal matters,25 while concurrently stating that civil courts
are not bound by church decisions regarding control of local church
property.26 Such a distinction is an unwarranted limitation of the hold-
ing in Watson and fails to acknowledge the reality of judicial review of
hierarchical church decisions; church property remains intimately con-
nected to ecclesiastical authority regardless of a civil court's unwilling-
ness to acknowledge the relationship. Watson is a pragmatic decision
in that it faces the fundamental question of separation of church and
state without totally abrogating the inevitable role of the judiciary in
church property disputes. 27 The real task of civil courts is not to re-
solve property disputes without referring to questions of church doc-
trine but to ensure that, in resolving property disputes, civil courts do
not in effect reverse doctrinal decisions of church hierarchical organiza-
tions.28
B. The Failure of Watson: The Implied Trust Doctrine and the
Evolution of the Neutral Principles Standard
The decision in Watson was intended by the Court to abolish the
use of the implied trust doctrine29 and to create a functional alternative
to maintain the separation of church and state. The failure of Watson
to abolish the implied trust doctrine, however, led to the inception of
the neutral principles standard and a consequential weakening of the
judicial deference requirement.
The implied trust doctrine asserts that church property donated by
the congregation is subject to an implied trust of use for the propaga-
tion of the religious tenets of the faith as they existed at the time of the
donation.3 0 The implied trust doctrine had required not only a deter-
mination of tenets of the past congregational beliefs but an interpreta-
25. 99 S. Ct. at 3025. Although the Court in Jones stated that civil courts must defer to
the judgment of the "highest" tribunal of ecclesiastical authority, id., Watson did not require
that the highest tribunal act before civil courts must defer to ecclesiastical judgments. 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
724-25 (1976).
26. 99 S. Ct. at 3025.
27. Watson has been the subject of much criticism, however. See C. ZOLLMAN, AMERI-
CAN CHURCH LAW 291 (1933).
28. The Court in Watson was keenly aware of the effect that civil court review could
have on church authority and therefore fashioned a method of review that minimized intru-
sions into church affairs. See 80 U.S. (13 wall.) at 734.
29. Id. at 725, 727-29.
30. The implied trust doctrine was first articulated in Craigdallie v. Aikman, 3 Eng. Rep.
601, 606 (H.L. 1813) (Scot.) and was more fully developed in Attorney General ex rel Man-
der v. Pearson, 36 Eng. Rep. 135 (Ch. 1817).
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tion of the present beliefs of the opposing factions in the dispute .3
While such an endeavor may have been acceptable for an eighteenth
century English court, it is clearly impermissible under modem consti-
tutional requirements.3 2 The ultimate effect of the implied trust doc-
trine was to discourage evolution of church doctrine by awarding
property to those members, no matter how few, who had remained un-
swerving in their beliefs.33
Although the use of the doctrine by American courts was force-
fully criticized in Watson v. Jones, two major factors combined to limit
the effect of the Watson decision on the implied trust doctrine. Watson
was a federal diversity case that predated the landmark case of Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins34 and, although the fourteenth amendment had
been enacted, its provisions had not been held to apply the protections
of the Bill of Rights to the states.35 As a result, the decision in Watson
was merely general federal common law and, as such, was not binding
on the states, leaving the state courts free to continue their use of the
implied trust doctrine.
The principle of judicial deference to church hierarchical decisions
relating to church doctrine, as articulated in Watson, was later recog-
nized as constitutionally required 6 in Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Ca/he-
31. The subtleties of religious doctrine are often incomprehensible to the lay judge. See
Craigdallie v. Aikman, 4 Eng. Rep. 435 (H.L. 1820) (Scot.), in which Lord Eldon admitted,
after the second appeal of the case to the House of Lords, that his attempt to understand
even the basic controversy was "hopeless."
32. Modern courts have agreed that, when matters of church doctrine must be examined
in order to resolve church property disputes, civil courts have no jurisdiction over questions
of religious doctrine or polity. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. at 724-25; Jones v. Wolf, 99 S. Ct. at 3025. While courts have been diligent in reciting
this principle of law, the difficulties faced in its application have resulted in holdings that
appear to belie the statement of the principle. The implied trust doctrine is difficult to apply
for practical reasons: church property is often purchased with money collected over a long
period of time from many different sources. It is difficult to identify donors, much less dis-
cern their intent at the time of the donation.
The implied trust doctrine originated in England at a time when the Anglican Church
was the established state church. The close relationship between church and state made
judicial interpretation of religious doctrine at least more acceptable, if not less arduous.
However, the peculiar relationship that gave birth to the doctrine made it singularly incom-
patible with the American heritage of separation of church and state.
33. See, e.g., General Assembly of Free Church of Scotland v. Overtoun, [1904] A.C.
515 (Scot.), in which a small group of congregations was awarded over 800 churches.
34. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
35. The first amendment was applied to the states in Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245,
248 (1934), Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) and Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306, 310 (1952).
36. Although the three-tiered holding of Watson has not subsequently been applied as a
constitutional requirement, the Court has viewed the underlying principle of judicial defer-
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draP7 and Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral.38 In both cases, the
Supreme Court reversed attempts by New York to divest the.Russian
Orthodox Church of control of St. Nicholas Cathedral, the See of the
Bishop of the American archdiocese of the Church.3 9 The Supreme
Court recognized that the controversy over beneficial use of the cathe-
dral was "strictly a matter of ecclesiastical government" 40 and refused
to sustain what it viewed as interference by New York in the free exer-
cise of religion of the Russian church. The Court in Kedroff subscribed
to the same basic assumption that underlay the rationale of Watson-
that control of church property is an incident of ecclesiastical authority,
which is governed by church law,41 and that to ignore this relationship
is to infringe upon the right of free exercise of religion of the members
of the church.42 The control of church property in the wake of a schism
was viewed as an inherently ecclesiastical concern, a manifestation of
ecclesiastical authority beyond the review of civil courts. Thus, after
seventy-five years, Watson was finally recognized as a decision that was
based on the requirements of the first amendment.
Against this background, the Supreme Court again considered the
implied trust doctrine nearly one hundred years after the Court first
had rejected it. In Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Prebysterian Church43 (Hull Church), the
ence as a constitutional requirement. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Mem. Presby. Church, 393 U.S. at 447.
The Court in Kedroff stated that "[e]ven in those cases when the property right follows
as an incident from decisions of the church custom or law on ecclesiastical issues, the church
rule controls. This under our Constitution necessarily follows in order that there may be
free exercise of religion." 344 U.S. at 120-21 (footnote omitted). Kedroff provided a clear
indication that the Court viewed the requirements of Watson as constitutionally mandated.
See Note, "And ofyour law, look ye to it"-The State's Role in Ecclesiastical Property Dis-
putes, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 138, 140.
37. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
38. 363 U.S. 190 (1960) (per curiam).
39. Kreshik involved the same parties as Kedroff. The trial court in Kedroff based its
decision on a statute that transferred control of the cathedral, N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW
§§ 105-107 (McKinney 1952), which was intended to divest the Moscow Patriarch of control
of the cathedral because of fears that the Patriarch was under the control of the communist
government in Russia. On remand of Kedroff to the New York courts, the same result was
reached on common law grounds, as opposed to the statutory grounds of the decision in the
first trial. On appeal under the name of Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, the United
States Supreme Court again reversed, holding that the same protections that had prohibited
New York from infringing religious freedom by statute also precluded infringement through
judicial action. 363 U.S. at 191.
40. 344 U.S. at 115.
41. Id. at 120-21. See notes 23 & 24 supra and accompanying text.
42. See note 7 supra.
43. 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
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Court rejected Georgia's use of the implied trust doctrine to award con-
trol of local church property to two secessionist congregations from the
Presbyterian Church in the United States, a hierarchical church organi-
zation.'" The local congregations asserted that the general church had
departed from the doctrines of the faith by becoming involved in a se-
ries of political issues and by denying that the doctrine of foreordina-
tion was required in the reformed theology.45 These doctrinal
differences led to the separation of the local congregation from the na-
tional church. The United States Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded the case to the Georgia Supreme Court46 in an opinion that is
significant for its dualistic approach to the dispute. The Court ac-
knowledged that the holding in Watson had a "clear constitutional
ring"47 and that it had been elevated to constitutional status by Kedroff
and Kreshik.48 The Court in Hull Church, however, said that neutral
principles of law49 existed that could be used to resolve church property
disputes without establishing the churches to which the church prop-
erty is awarded. The Court offered no justification for its failure to
apply the Watson standard of judicial deference, but it is apparent that
the Court was displeased with the direct judicial review of church doc-
trine required by the Georgia implied trust doctrine.5 0 The reference to
"neutral principles of law" may have been designed to emphasize the
deficiencies of the implied trust doctrine rather than to establish a new
standard ofjudicial review .5  The Court's oblique reference to the neu-
44. The organizational form of the church involved in the dispute is often critical in
determining the appropriate standard of judicial review. The significance of church organi-
zational structure is discussed in the text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
45. Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights Presby. Church, 224 Ga. 61, 71-72, 159
S.E.2d 690, 697-98 (1968), rev'dsub nom. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Mem. Presby. Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969). Foreordination is the belief that some persons
are destined for hell even before they are born. The political issues ranged from urging an
end to the bombing in Vietnam to refusing to endorse a constitutional amendment designed
to allow Bible reading in public schools.
46. 393 U.S. at 452.
47. Id. at 446.
48. "In Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), the Court converted the
principle of Watson as qualified by Gonzales into a constitutional rule." Presbyterian
Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem. Presby. Church, 393 U.S. at 447.
49. 393 U.S. at 449.
50. Id. at 449-52.
51. Thus, the First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may
play in resolving church property disputes. It is obvious, however, that not every
civil court decision as to property claimed by a religious organization jeopardizes
values protected by the First Amendment. Civil courts do not inhibit free exercise
of religion merely by opening their doors to disputes involving church property.
And there are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes,
which can be applied without "establishing" churches to which property is
[Vol. 13
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tral principles standard in Hull Church, however, was to serve as the
basis for development and acceptance of the doctrine in later cases.
The assertion that property disputes could be resolved according to
neutral principles of law represented an abandonment of the Watson
assumption that church property disputes following a schism were
manifestations of ecclesiastical disputes over which civil courts have no
jurisdiction.
On remand of Hull Church to the Georgia Supreme Court, the
implied trust doctrine was abandoned completely, and the Georgia
court again awarded beneficial use of the local church property to the
congregation on the basis of legal title. 2 The Georgia court declared
that the body holding legal title was entitled to beneficial use of the
property. This approach seems to be in conflict with Watson because
the formal title approach in effect reversed the decision made by the
general assembly that the minority was the legitimate successor of the
original congregation. 3
The United States Supreme Court, however, denied certiorari to
the appeal challenging the formal title approach of the Georgia court
54
on the same day it tacitly accepted the formal title approach as a "neu-
awarded. But First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church prop-
erty litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over
religious doctrine and practice. If civil courts undertake to resolve such controver-
sies in order to adjudicate the property dispute, the hazards are ever present of
inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular
interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern.
Id. at 449. The Court's reference to neutral principles at first appears to be an innocuous
statement of fact, rather than the creation of a new judicial standard of review in church
property disputes.
The neutral principles language precedes language criticizing civil courts that decide
property disputes based on court interpretation of church doctrine, a clear reference to the
dangers of the implied trust doctrine and not a criticism of the Watson judicial deference
standard. In the absence of any judicially noted deficiency in the Watson judicial deference
standard, the Court in Hull Church would have no reason for intentionally creating a new
standard of review. However, the statement that courts do not inhibit freedom of religion
merely by opening their doors to church property disputes may indicate the Court's underly-
ing rationale. This statement follows the Court's discussion of Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas
Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952). In Kedroff, the Court twice reversed New York's award of
control of the Cathedral to the American Russian Orthodox Diocese because of New York's
failure to follow the judicial deference rule. The Court's language implies that applying the
judicial deference rule fails to "open the court's doors" to the claimants. The Court ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the limited review available to a court under the Watson judicial
deference standard. In this light the reference to neutral principles appears to be a more
calculated statement by the Court, rather than simply an innocuous statement of fact.
52. Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights Presby. Church, 225 Ga. 259, 167 S.E.2d 658
(1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1041 (1970).
53. For a discussion of the shortcomings of the formal title approach, see note 96 infra.
54. 396 U.S. at 1041.
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tral principle of law" in Maryland & Virginia Eldershio of the Churches
of God v. Church of God55(Sharpsburg). In Sharpsburg, the Court dis-
missed an appeal from a decision awarding control of local church
property to secessionist congregations. The Court held in a per curiam
opinion that, because the Maryland court's resolution of the dispute
involved no inquiry into issues of religious doctrine, the appeal failed
to raise a substantial federal question.16 In both the majority opinion
of Hull Church and the per curiam opinion of Sharpsburg, the Court
did not analyze the relationship between church property disputes and
underlying problems of doctrine and ecclesiastical authority as it had in
Watson and Kedroff.
The last Supreme Court case to address the neutral principles stan-
dard before its explicit acceptance in Jones v. Wolf was Serbian Eastern
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich"T(Serbian) in which the Court re-
jected application of the neutral principles standard in a dispute over
the validity of a defrockment of a bishop, which in turn determined
control of diocesan property. The Court believed the issue of the reor-
ganization of the diocese to be a matter of church government that was
exempt from civil court review 8.5  The Court in Serbian also explicitly
stated that the control of church property was an ecclesiastical matter
determined by church decisions regarding spiritual leadership.5 9 It is
unclear why the Court in Serbian viewed church property as an inci-
dent of ecclesiastical authority while the Court in Hull Church and
Sharpsburg was able to divorce the question of property from ecclesias-
tical control.61 In this rather confused state of affairs, the Court ac-
cepted the case of Jones v. Wo/f 61 for review.
55. 396 U.S. 367 (1970) (per curiam).
56. Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall concurred in an opinion that implied that the neu-
tral principles approach was valid so long as the application of such principles involved no
consideration of church doctrine. Id. at 368. Both the per curiam and concurring opinions
confirmed the shift away from the Watson concern for the actual effect of civil court review
on ecclesiastical authority. Id. at 368-70 (Brennan, J., concurring).
57. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
58. Id. at 721-22.
59. Id. at 709. In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected Gonzalez v. Archbishop,
280 U.S. 1 (1929), which had held that the Watson judicial deference standard could be
circumvented in cases of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness. Id. at 16.
60. The differing standards of review may be explained by the Court's desire to inter-
vene in those cases in which a local unified congregation stands to be divested of its church
property by a national organization. See text following note 102 infra.
61. 99 S. Ct. 3020 (1979).
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II. JONES V WOLF
A. Facts
The fact situation presented to the Court in Jones v. Wolf provided
an appropriate vehicle for review of the Watson judicial deference
standard because both cases involved the split of a local congregation
and a subsequent ruling by a church judicatory on the true identity of
the local congregation. The Vineville Presbyterian Church of Macon,
Georgia, was organized in 1904 and in that year was established as a
member of the Augusta Macon Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church
in the United States, which has a hierarchical form of government.62
The government of the local church was controlled by its session, and
in ascending order by the presbytery, the synod, and the general assem-
bly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States (PCUS). The au-
thority of each governing body is set forth in the Book of Church
Order, which serves as the constitution of the PCUS.
63
At a congregational meeting of the Vineville Church, a majority
voted to separate from the PCUS. The minority remained on the
church rolls but ceased to participate in church affairs and conducted
services elsewhere. Because the schism resulted from a dispute over
church doctrine, the minority sought review of the majority's actions by
the Augusta Macon Presbytery as provided by the Book of Church Or-
der.6 4 The Book of Church Order subjects the session to the review and
control of the presbytery in all matters and authorizes the presbytery to
replace the leadership of the local congregation, to winnow its member-
ship, and to take control of the congregation. Under this authority, the
Presbytery appointed a commission to investigate the schism. This
commission issued a written ruling declaring that the minority faction
constituted the true congregation and divesting the majority faction of
all authority to exercise office derived from the PCUS. The minority
then brought a class action suit in state court to establish their right to
exclusive possession and use65 of the Vineville church property. It is
62. For a discussion of the structure and significance of church hierarchical government,
see note 18 supra and accompanying text.
63. 99 S. Ct. at 3023.
64. Id. at 3022-23.
65. The case did not present a question of legal tide, which was held by the trustees of
the Vineville Presbyterian Church or their successors in office. Id. at 3022. The Court in
Jones recognized that the true question presented was one of use of the property. Id. at
3024-25. It is apparent that in a congregational split, in which no question of legal title is
involved, the dispute cannot be resolved on the basis of the formal title doctrine. In a con-
gregational split, the formal title doctrine begs the question as to which faction of the for-
merly united congregation is entitled to beneficial use of the property.
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significant that both Watson and Jones dealt with doctrinal disputes in
which a church judicatory had resolved the underlying doctrinal dis-
pute, which in turn necessarily decided control of the local church
property.6 The disparate conclusions reached in Watson and Jones
illustrate the significance of the differences between the neutral princi-
ples and judicial deference approaches.67
B. Rationale of the Decision
In Jones, the Court held that civil courts are no longer required to
defer to church decisions affecting the use and control of church prop-
erty following a schism. 8 The Court approved the use of any neutral
principle that would allow civil courts to decide church property dis-
putes without considering matters of church doctrine; civil courts are
still required to use the judicial deference standard, however, in cases
in which resolution of the dispute cannot be made without reference to
church doctrine.69
The clarity of the holding in Jones is belied by the Court's failure
to distinguish the factually similar precedent of Watson v. Jones.
7
0
Rather than squarely addressing the implications of the holding in
Watson, the Court in Jones limited its view of Watson and the issues
involved in church property disputes. By ignoring the fact that the
Vineville property dispute was based on a doctrinal dispute, the Court
was able to circumvent the concern in Watson and Kedroff for the ef-
66. The facts in Watson present an almost identical situation. In response to an edict by
the general assembly, a local congregation of the PCUS suffered an internal split. The gen-
eral assembly recognized the majority as the true congregation, but the minority retained
effective control of the local church. The majority then sought declaratory relief to regain
control of the local church, basing their claim on the decision of the general assembly that
the majority constituted the true congregation.
67. The neutral principles rationale developed in the context of a unified congregation
seceding from a national organization, as in Hull Church and Sharpsburg. The neutral prin-
ciples rationale appears to work best when the dispute is between a local congregation and a
national hierarchical organization because, if no express trust is controlling, legal title will
be held by one of the parties in the dispute, and beneficial use of the property can be
awarded on that basis. Watson and Jones, however, present a very different situation be-
cause they involved a split within the congregation itself. If a civil court is to decide such a
dispute, it must consider factors other than legal title, including matters affecting church
doctrine, especially when title is in the name of the (unified) local congregation. For this
reason, Watson requires deference on the part of civil courts in such situations.
68. The Court, however, found that the "formal title" approach employed by the Geor-
gia courts was inapplicable in the context of a congregational schism. See text accompany-
ing notes 92-106 infra.
69. 99 S. Ct. at 3028.
70. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). See text accompanying notes 13 & 14 supra.
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fect of civil review of property disputes that have been resolved by
church judicatories.
The dual phrasing of the question to be decided indicates inconsis-
tencies in the Court's analysis. At first the Court stated: "The question
for decision is whether civil courts, consistent with the First and Four-
teenth Amendments to the Constitution, may resolve the dispute on the
basis of 'neutral principles of law,' or whether they must defer to the
resolution of an authoritative tribunal of the hierarchical church."
7 1
Later in the case, the Court presented the question as "which faction
of the formerly united Vineville congregation is entitled to possess and
enjoy the property . ... There can be little doubt about the general
authority of civil courts to resolve this question."72
The first phrasing acknowledges an essential fact about the case: a
hierarchical church decision has resolved the dispute. The second
phrasing ignores the fact of the church decision-an omission that is
carried through the remainder of the opinion. By ignoring the hierar-
chical decision of the presbytery of the PCUS and focusing only on the
method of civil court review, the Court avoided addressing the first
amendment considerations of interference with freedom of religion that
often attend civil court review of church disputes.73
The thrust of the Court's support for the neutral principles doc-
trine began with the assertion that states have general authority to re-
71. 99 S. Ct. at 3022.
72. Id. at 3024-25.
73. The dissent noted the majority's failure to consider the effect of civil court review on
religious freedom:
The Georgia courts, as a matter of state law, granted control to the schismatic
faction, and thereby ffeetiveiy reversed the doctrinal decision ofthe church courts.
This indirect interference by the civil courts with the resolution of religious disputes
within the church is no less proscribed by the First Amendment than is the direct
decision of questions of doctrine and practice.
Id. at 3030 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The dissent went on to point out that
the first amendment freedom of religion clause is meant to protect churches from civil law
interference, not to protect courts from having to resolve religious disputes that involve doc-
trinal questions. Id. at 3030-31 n.2.
The dissent also characterized the neutral principles analysis as a restrictive evidentiary
rule: civil courts may examine church documents for an express trust only if such docu-
ments do not require courts to consider religious terms or precepts. Id. at 3030. As the
dissent pointed out, most church organizations define their internal structure in terms of
religious authority. The effect of such a rule is to limit a court's ability to examine any
church documents; in the absence of such evidence, a court will presumably have to impose
some rule of church law derived from state law. While the majority took the position that
such a limited review will free civil courts from religious entanglement, id. at 3025, the
minority argued that the effect of such an evidentiary rule is to allow a civil court effectively
to ignore a previous adjudication of a church dispute by an authoritative church body. Id.
at 3030. See text accompanying note 85 infra.
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solve church property disputes because of the legitimate state interest in
peacefully resolving such disputes and in providing a civil forum for
the conclusive determination of such rights.74 While such a proposition
may be true as a general description of state power, the state interest
must be balanced with the uniquely protected freedom of religion, and
at times the private interest in freedom of religion must prevail over the
state interest of providing a civil forum.75 The Court did recognize that
the "First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts
may play in resolving church property disputes,"76 but quickly dis-
pensed with this limitation. The majority asserted that, although the
first amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving church property
disputes on a doctrinal basis, and although the first amendment re-
quires civil courts to defer to hierarchical decisions regarding doctrine
and polity, a state may adopt any method of settling church property
disputes, so long as it does not undertake any consideration of doctrinal
matters.77
This reasoning, which is central to the Court's conclusion, is weak
in two respects: first, the Court failed to analyze the relation between
74. Id. at 3025.
75. In Kedroff, the Court suggested that in certain cases the balancing mechanism must
give way to church decisions:
Ours is a government which by the "laws of its being" allows no statute, state or
national, that prohibits free exercise of religion. There are occasions when civil
courts must draw lines between the responsibilities of church and state for the dis-
position or use of property. Even in those cases where the property right follows as
an incident from decisions of the church custom or law or ecclesiastical issues, the
church rule controls.
344 U.S. at 121.
76. 99 S. Ct. at 3025 (citing Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem.
Presby. Church, 393 U.S. at 449).
77. It is also clear, however, that "the First Amendment severely circumscribes the
role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes." . . . [Pres-
byterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem. Presby. Church (Hull Church),
393 U.S. at 449]. Most importantly, the First Amendment prohibits civil courts
from resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and prac-
tice. Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, . . . [426 U.S. at 710]; Md & Va.
Churches v. Sharpsburg Church .... [396 U.S. at 368];. . .[Hull Church, 393 U.S.
at 449]. As a corollary to this commandment, the Amendment requires that civil
courts defer to the resolution of issues of religious doctrine or polity by the highest
court of a hierarchical church organization. Serbian Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S.
[at] 724-25 . . .; cf. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733-34 . . .(1871).
Subject to these limitations, however, the First Amendment does not dictate that a
State must follow a particular method of resolving church property disputes. In-
deed, "a State may adopt any one of various approaches for settling church prop-
erty disputes so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether
the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith." Md & Va. Churches, 396
U.S. at 368. .. .(Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
99 S. Ct. at 3025.
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the control of church property and ecclesiastical authority, and second,
the Court took an unnecessarily limited view of the holding in Watson.
To paraphrase the dissent's discussion of the first flaw, the first
amendment is not designed merely to protect courts from having to
acknowledge the existence of doctrinal disputes, but is designed to pro-
tect churches from direct review or indirect interference with religious
freedom.78 The key to the neutral principles approach appears to be to
decide the property dispute without directly alluding to the underlying
doctrinal issue. But civil courts cannot abrogate the relationship be-
tween church property and ecclesiastical authority simply by pretend-
ing that the relationship does not exist.7 9 While such an approach may
obviate the need for direct judicial review of church doctrine,80 it does
not diminish the inhibiting effects on the freedom of religious organiza-
tions to govern their internal affairs. The nature of the relationship
between ecclesiastical authority and control of property is well illus-
trated by the facts in Jones. According to the provisions of the Book of
Church Order, the congregation consists of those admitted to the
Lord's Table who are active in the church's life and work. The congre-
gation is subject to the review and control of the presbytery as part of
the presbytery's general authority to order whatever pertains to the
spiritual welfare of the church under its control.81 As a consequence of
the presbytery's resolution of the religious dispute within the congrega-
tion, it awarded possession of the local property to the faction repre-
senting the true congregation, which by definition consists of those
admitted to the Lord's Table. In reversing the award of the property to
the minority faction, the Court effectively reversed the presbytery's rul-
78. See note 73 supra.
79. The majority asserted that "[tihe neutral principles approach. . . obviates entirely
the need for an analysis or examination of ecclesiastical polity or doctrine in settling church
property disputes." 99 S. Ct. at 3026. It is questionable how a court can examine "language
of the deeds, the terms of the local church charters, . . . and the provisions in the constitu-
tion of the general church concerning the ownership and control of church property," id. at
3025, without touching upon doctrinal issues. Under Watson, however, there is no need for
analysis of doctrine: "This rule admits of no inquiry into the existing religious opinions of
those who compromise the legal or regular organization." 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 725. Con-
trary to the majority's assertion, the neutral principles approach not only requires an exami-
nation of religious polity in certain cases, but stands to benefit from such in inquiry. See text
accompanying notes 100-02 infra.
80. Every case cited as support for the majority's position involved an underlying doctri-
nal dispute that in turn resulted in a fight for control of local church property: Watson
concerned a dispute over the propriety of forcing southerners to repent their views on slav-
ery before entering ministry; Kedroff questioned the authority of the Moscow Patriarch over
churches in the United States; Hull Church discussed violations of the original tenets of
faith; Serbian disputed the authority of the synod to suspend a bishop.
81. 99 S. Ct. at 3028 n.7.
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ing on the true identity of the congregation. Thus, without addressing
the underlying doctrinal issues, the Court seriously compromised the
authority of the PCUS to resolve congregational disputes involving re-
ligious doctrine by depriving the PCUS of its control over the temporal
manifestation of spiritual authority, viz., property.
The second flaw in the Court's reasoning is its limited view of the
Watson and Kedroff precedents. The Court stated that "the First
Amendment requires that civil courts defer to the resolution of issues of
religious doctrine or polity by the highest court of a hierarchical church
organization" and cited Watson as authority for this proposition.82
While it is clear that Watson stands for at least that proposition, it
stands for much more. The Court in Watson was faced with a fight for
control of church property in a hierarchical organization that had al-
ready resolved the underlying doctrinal issue. It is in that context that
the Watson Court declared that, whenever questions of faith, disci-
pline, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the
church, "the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as
binding on them, in their application to the case before them."83 Because
the Court in Watson accepted the essential relationship between church
property and ecclesiastical authority, it also understood that church de-
cisions in congregational property disputes must be considered in order
to preserve the separation between church and state.84 Thus, Watson
does not stand for the mere proposition that civil courts are bound by
ecclesiastical resolutions of issues of doctrine and polity; rather, it
stands for the broader proposition that civil courts are also bound by
ecclesiastical decisions that determine control of church property.8 5
82. Id. at 3025.
83. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727 (emphasis added).
84. All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this
government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and
would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by
one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed. It
is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals
for decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be
binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the
organism itself provides for.
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 729. It is apparent that the Court in Watson was concerned with the
effect of civil review on ecclesiastical authority, and not merely with the role of civil courts
in such disputes.
85. Although Serbian did not resolve the dispute over control of church property di-
rectly, the Court declared that "[r]esolution of the religious disputes [over the bishop's
defrockment] here affects the control of church property." 426 U.S. at 709. The majority in
Jones failed to explain why the doctrinal resolution of the Vineville split was not control-
ling; rather, the neutral principles approach allowed the court to disregard the church deci-
sion as a matter of "church polity."
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The acceptance in Jones of any method of settling church property dis-
putes that does not consider matters of doctrine ignores the effect of
civil review on ecclesiastical authority and freedom of religion. Al-
though the fact situations in Jones and Watson are very similar, the
Court in Jones failed to distinguish the precedent of Watson; it is as if
the Court in Jones had changed the nature of the controversy, which
the Watson Court viewed as ultimately ecclesiastical in nature, by
viewing the dispute through the new theory of neutral principles.86 By
narrowly focusing its view on the question of property use, the Court
was able to avoid the first amendment considerations of Watson and
Kedroff 
8 7
The justification offered by the Court for adoption of the neutral
principles standard was twofold: first, the standard had been "ap-
proved" by previous Supreme Court decisions and, second, the stan-
dard would result in less entanglement of church and state.88 The
previous approval of the neutral principles standard was ambivalent at
best and failed to offer compelling support for its adoption. The major-
ity also referred to Sharpsburg as approving the use of the neutral prin-
ciples standard, but, as the dissent in Jones points out, the decision in
Sharpsburg involved a review of many of the same factors used in a
Watson-type analysis to determine the church structure involved.
89
The majority also classified Serbian as a case that contains approving
reference to the neutral principles standard, when in fact Serbian re-
jected the application of that standard to matters of church polity.90
Jones v. Wolf is the first United States Supreme Court case to expressly
86. It is perhaps redundant to describe laws as neutral, because in theory laws are sup-
posed to operate in a neutral or impartial manner. Civil courts do not necessarily become
less neutral by acknowledging the religious nature of the dispute before them. See McKeag,
The Problem of Resolving Property Disputes in Hierarchical Churches, 48 PENN. B.A.Q. 281,
285 n.13 (1977). The use of the word "neutral" implies that the judicial deference standard
is somehow unjust or unfair. For a discussion of the Court's motivation for adopting a
neutral principles standard, see text accompanying note 98 infra.
87. By avoiding the questions presented by the more searching analyses of Watson,
Kedroff, and Serbian, the Court in Jones allowed those decisions to stand as alternatives to
the neutral principles approach. However, the Court in Jones acknowledged that, in situa-
tions in which the courts are compelled to consider church documents in order to identify the
faction entitled to beneficial use of the property, civil courts are required to use judicial
deference. 99 S. Ct. at 3026. Watson was not decided in such a limited context, but its
requirement of judicial deference must now be seen as limited to those situations in which
courts must consider church polity in order to award beneficial use of the property. Civil
courts remain free to use the judicial deference standard if they so desire. Id.
88. Id. at 3025.
89. Id. at 3030 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also notes 52-54 supra.
90. 426 U.S. at 721.
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approve of the neutral principles standard of review in church property
disputes.
The Court also attempted to justify acceptance of the neutral prin-
ciples standard on the ground that it should result in less entanglement
of church and state. The Court characterized the neutral principles
standard as an objective method of review, based on the familar con-
cepts of trust and property law, which thereby promises to free civil
courts completely from consideration of religious doctrine and polity.91
Again, it can be seen that the Supreme Court was more concerned with
freeing civil courts from having to refer to doctrinal issues than with
the effect of such decisions on the churches involved.
Curiously, the Court stated that the neutral principles approach is
most effective when civil courts are able to discern an express trust pro-
vision in church documents, such as the church constitution, which is
then to be enforced by the courts.92 This approach corresponds exactly
to the first tier of review prescribed in Watson and is in fact a standard
of mandatory judicial deference based on an ecclesiastical determina-
tion.93 When the search for an express trust encounters religious con-
cepts in the definition of the beneficiary of the trust, the courts are to
defer to the authoritative ecclesiastical resolution of the issue.94 Under
such a method of review, the identity of the Vineville congregation,
that is, those admitted to the Lord's Table, should be determined exclu-
sively by the ecclesiastical courts. Regardless of the outcome, however,
it is clear that the first step in the neutral principles analysis involves
just as much consideration of church polity and doctrine as does the
Watson judicial deference standard. It is clear from the Jones major-
ity's own description of the neutral principles trust inquiry that the neu-
tral principles approach does not "[obviate] entirely the need for an
analysis or examination of ecclesiastical polity or doctrine in settling
church property disputes."9" Having established the framework for the
neutral principles approach, the Court in Jones proceeded to examine
the Georgia Supreme Court's award of beneficial use of the property to
91. 99 S. Ct. at 3025.
92. Id. at 3025-26.
93. See notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text. The majority in Jones dismissed Wat-
son as a common law decision that in fact supported the neutral principles approach of
express trusts; the Jones Court failed to take into consideration the language of Kedroff v.
Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. at 115-16, Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue
Hull Mem. Presby. Church, 393 U.S. at 446, and Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. at 709-10, all of which apply the principles of Watson based on first amendment
considerations.
94. 99 S. Ct. at 3026.
95. Id.
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the formal title holder.96
C. Inapplicability of the Georgia Formal Title Approach
Having endorsed the use of the neutral principles standard by civil
courts, the Jones Court concluded that the neutral principles standard
as developed by Georgia was inapplicable to the Vineville congrega-
tional split. 97 The Supreme Court in Jones recognized the inapplicabil-
ity of the formal title doctrine in a congregational split, but it
speculated that Georgia may have adopted a presumptive rule of ma-
jority representation, which the Court approved as being consistent
with both the first amendment and the neutral principles standard.98 It
is rather startling that the Court was able to approve the proposition
that civil courts can impose upon churches a rule of self-government
that provides a "presumptive" 99 method of determining the identity of
96. Jones v. Wolf, 241 Ga. 208, 211, 243 S.E.2d 860, 863-64 (1978), vacated and re-
manded, 99 S. Ct. 3020 (1979).
97. 99 S. Ct. at 3027-28. Georgia requires an examination of church documents for an
express trust; if none is found, beneficial use of the property is awarded to the individuals or
corporation holding legal title. Georgia's formal title approach, however, was developed in
situations involving the split of a unified congregation from the national organization. See
Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights Presby. Church, 225 Ga. 259, 167 S.E.2d 658 (1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1041 (1970); Carnes v. Smith, 236 Ga. 30, 222 S.E.2d 322, cert. denied,
429 U.S. 868 (1976). In Eastern Heights, the Georgia court awarded beneficial use to the
local congregation on the basis of formal title, while in Carnes the court found an express
trust in favor of the general church in the church constitution. While the formal title ap-
proach can determine property rights between a local congregation and the national organi-
zation, it is incapable of determining beneficial use when the local congregation itself has
split, because title is usually held for the benefit of the entire congregation. In such situa-
tions the award of beneficial use to the congregation holding title would be a meaningless act
because the real issue is whichfaction of the congregation is entitled to beneficial use. Hav-
ing failed to find an express trust in favor of the national church, the Georgia Supreme
Court held that the Vineville congregation was entitled to the beneficial use of the property.
Without further analysis, the Georgia court decreed that the secessionist majority was the
representative of the local congregation. 241 Ga. 208, 212, 243 S.E.2d 860, 864 (1978), va-
cated and remanded, 99 S. Ct. 3020 (1979). The failure of the Georgia Supreme Court to
offer any rationale for its decision to award beneficial use of the property to the majority
faction rendered the application of the neutral principles doctrine meaningless.
98. The Court noted that the Georgia Code contains a provision providing a means of
identifying the true congregation in a schism. "The majority of those who adhere to its
organization and doctrines represent the church. The withdrawal by one part of a congrega-
tion from the original body, or uniting with another church or denomination, is a relinquish-
ment of all rights in the church abandoned." GA. CODE ANN. § 22-5504 (1977). Adherence
to the language of the statute can, however, produce contradictory results. The first sentence
requires an award of the property to the majority faction, while the second sentence can
require an award of the property to the minority faction, because, e.g., in Jones it was the
majority who abandoned the original body and joined another denomination.
99. The majority in Jones referred to a "presumption" of majority rule, indicating that
such a presumption can be overcome by way of an express trust or any method that "does
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a local congregation. In the case of the PCUS, the general assembly is
vested with final spiritual authority over the membership, and therefore
the identity, of local congregations." ° The neutral principle of pre-
sumptive majority rule defeats the purpose of a hierarchical organiza-
tion and consequently infringes upon the freedom of religious
organizations to govern their internal affairs. The presumptive major-
ity representation rule also presents a serious threat to the authority of
hierarchical organizations. The majority representation rule has its
roots in the Watson trichotomy. Decisions of the majority in independ-
ent congregations are to receive the deference of the courts. 01 But con-
gregations that are members of a national hierarchical organization,
such as the Vineville congregation, are not governed by congregational
majority rule, and civil courts may not properly impose such a criterion
upon them.
In addition to requesting a clarification of the Georgia court's ra-
tionale for declaring the majority faction to be the recipient of the ben-
eficial use of the property, the Court in Jones also noted that, if
Georgia law requires courts to consider matters of church polity in
resolving the dispute, "then the First Amendment requires that the
Georgia courts give deference to the presbyterial commission's deter-
mination of that church's identity."1 2 Thus, the Court in Jones viewed
not impair free exercise rights or entangle the civil courts in matters of religious contro-
versy." 99 S. Ct. at 3028. Such h rule itself seems to infringe upon free exercise rights by
requiring churches to defeat a civil presumption about the mode of self-government in the
church. The Court was impressing democratic notions of government on institutions that
are founded on principles of religious faith. The language of the Court in Serbian is cogent:
Indeed, it is the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are reached
and are to be accepted as matters of faith whether or not -rational or measurable by
objective criteria. Constitutional concepts of due process, involving secular notions
of "fundamental fairness" or impermissible objects, are therefore hardly relevant
to such matters of ecclesiastical cognizance.
426 U.S. at 714-15 (footnote omitted).
100. 99 S. Ct. at 3028.
101. The Court in Jones cited Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872), for the
proposition that majority rule is generally employed in the governance of religious societies.
99 S. Ct. at 3027. However, Bouldin involved an independent congregation that used major-
ity rule prior to the congregational split and therefore represents an application of the Wat-
son judicial deference standard.
102. 99 S. Ct. at 3028 (footnote omitted). Georgia law also stated that church property be
held according to the terms of the church government and that a local church affiliated with
a hierarchical association is subject to the higher authority of the organization, Carnes v.
Smith, 236 Ga. at 33, 38, 222 S.E.2d at 325, 328. The Court in Jones stated that requiring a
civil court to identify church structure "would appear to require a civil court to pass on
questions of religious doctrine, and to usurp the function of the commission appointed by
the Presbytery, which already has determined that petitioners represent the 'true congregation'
afthe Vineville church." 99 S. Ct. at 3028 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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the Watson rule of judicial deference as mandatory in those situations
in which civil courts must consider church organization in order to re-
solve the controversy. The inapplicability, however, of the formal title
approach and the religious infringement of the presumptive majority
rule indicate that Jones is a case in which the resolution of a property
dispute requires determination of the church structure and judicial def-
erence to a hierarchical decision. Indeed, the majority failed to explain
how church property disputes can ever be resolved without infringing
upon religious freedom when civil courts are free to ignore hierarchical
decisions of authoritative church bodies. The major effect of Jones v.
Wof appears to be to free civil courts from the necessity of considering
the effect of civil review of property disputes over which ecclesiastical
authority has been exercised. Such freedom, however, appears to in-
vert the intent of the first amendment.
III. CONCLUSION
The decision of Jones v. Wof establishes an alternative standard
of judicial review in church property disputes, but its failure to dis-
tinguish Watson v. Jones could lead to an inconsistent application of
the neutral principles and judicial deference standards. The use of in-
consistent standards in what appears to be identical fact situations may
lead to the use of the neutral principles standard as an interventionist
tool by civil courts. The standard of review used by the courts will be
determined by a court's desire to intervene on behalf of a particular
party without regard to the effect of such review on first amendment
freedoms. Such an interventionist pattern of review can be discerned in
the few cases decided since the articulation of the neutral principles
rationale. The cases of Hull Church, Sharpsburg, and Jones, all of
which approved of the neutral principles standard, involved local con-
gregations who sought to secede from national organizations while re-
taining control of local church property. Kedroff, Kreshik and Serbian,
which applied the Watson judicial deference standard, involved at-
tempts by an entire diocese led by their bishops to secede from interna-
tional church organizations. The inconsistent application of a standard
of review may be due to a judicial willingness to allow a unified con-
gregation to secede and retain control of its local church because of the
Court's belief that a local congregation should not be divested of its
church building by a national organization no longer having a congre-
gation in the community.
When a schism is led by a bishop who seeks to assert control of all
property in a diocese, however, courts are not faced with the possibility
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of divesting local congregations of use of their churches. Regardless of
how the bishop's secessionist attempt is resolved, local congregations
will retain use of their property, either as members of the original
church or as members of a schismatic diocese. Thus, courts may be
more willing to defer to hierarchical decisions when a local congrega-
tion retains control of local property, regardless of hierarchical strug-
gles for control of the local property. This analysis suggests that the
neutral principles doctrine will be used as a device to ensure that, when
local congregations secede from national organizations, the congrega-
tion will be able to retain control of local property. Such a result could
pose a serious threat to the authority of hierarchical organizations,
which depend on control of church property to complement their spiri-
tual authority. The Supreme Court in Jones has suggested that
churches can circumvent the effect of the neutral principles doctrine by
providing for an express trust in the church constitution in favor of the
general church. When such a trust does not exist, it is encumbent on
the national organization to add this provision in order to protect and
maintain its effective control over local congregations.
The success or failure of the neutral principles standard should be
measured by the effect of civil court review on religious freedom. If the
neutral principles standard fails in its stated objective of decreasing
church-state entanglement, it will be due to the Jones Court's failure to
acknowledge the relationship between church property and ecclesiasti-
cal authority, a relationship that falls within the first amendment's pro-
tections. The Court in Watson was able to accept the paradox inherent
in church-state relations: in order to maintain the separation of church
and state, it is necessary to consider ecclesiastical decisions in civil trials
in order to ensure that civil courts do not infringe upon the authority of
religious organizations. The Court in Jones, however, has attempted to
avoid this paradox by focusing its attention solely on the function of
civil courts in intra-church property disputes. In the process, the Court
has increased the likelihood that civil review of church property dis-
putes will infringe upon the rights of hierarchical church organizations.
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